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Wender: Privacy Legislation: Protection of Individual Liberties or Threat

PRIVACY LEGISLATION: PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES OR THREAT TO A
FREE PRESS?
The United States is rapidly developing into a country of
data banks.' Concern is growing over the violations of individuals'
privacy and the serious repercussions which result from the massive and unchecked flow of information from, and between government agencies. 2 Attempts have been made to remedy the situation through the enactment of privacy legislation. One ambitious piece of privacy legislation 3 was recently proposed in the
United States Senate but died while in committee. The contents
of that defunct Senate bill4 are of interest because they may serve
as a model for future proposals. The purpose of this article, however, is not to examine those contents. Rather, it is to examine5
the opposition to the legislation posed by members of the press,
to determine whether such opposition was logically or constitutionally justified. Although the bill was not passed, the question
still remains whether the enactment of privacy legislation is compatible with the exercise of the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of the press.
1. A. NEIER, DOSSIER 1-16 (1975).

2. For instance, there has recently been a rising furor over allegations that the Central
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) may have been conducting a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation which has led to the accumulation of files on perhaps 10,000 American
citizens. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1. At hearings of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, which has been investigating this matter, the possibility was raised that the
C.I.A. was involved with other federal agencies, such as the F.B.I., as well. Id. at 30-31.
3. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For an historical look at the origins of this bill
see A. NEIER, DOSSIER 99-102 (1975).
4. The text of S. 2963 is printed in full in Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963 & S.
2964 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 591 (1974).
5. See Testimony of Harold W. Anderson, President, Omaha World-Herald, and Vice
Chairman, American Newspaper Publishers Association, accompanied by John R. Finnegan, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, Associated Press Managing Editors
Association; and Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., General Counsel, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963 & S. 2964 Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1
at 402 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Anderson]; Address by W.A. Homby,
Executive Editor, Denver Post, and Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee,
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Nat'l Newspaper Ass'n Fall Meeting, Sept. 20,
1974, on file in Hofstra Law Library [hereinafter cited as Address by Homby].
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BACKGROUND

Particularly large and sophisticated intelligence systems
have been developed by both state and federal governments to
implement what are referred to as criminal justice investigative
information systems.6 At the center of this information network
is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.),7 which processes
information received from and disseminates information to criminal justice agencies throughout the country. The information
compiled by these agencies consists primarily of criminal records,
prior arrest records and what is referred to as "intelligence data."8
Investigation into the procedures of record collection and dissemination followed by the F.B.I. has given rise to evidence that incomplete and inaccurate information is often indiscriminately
released to parties outside the criminal justice system Arguably,
the release of information pertaining to criminal convictions,
,where guilt has already been judicially established, raises serious
constitutional questions.'0 The constitutional problems are even
greater, however, where there is dissemination of arrest records
and so-called "intelligence data."" There is ample evidence that
arrest records are generally incomplete, misleading and misused. 2 When an agency such as the F.B.I. receives information
of an individual's arrest, there is often no follow-up attempted to
6. S.2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1974) (Congressional Findings).
7. Information is fed through a computerized system called the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) which has been under F.B.I. control since 1970. See Comment,
Arrest Records - Protecting the Innocent, 48 TuL. L. Rzv. 629, 630-32 (1974). For a more
in depth look at F.B.I. operations in this regard, see Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 102022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
8. Note, Protectionof Privacyof Computerized Records in the NationalCrime Information Center, 7 MICH. J. L. REF. 594, 601 (1974).
9. Although there is no evidence that the F.B.I. distributes its information directly
to private agencies or persons, it is clear that it does not keep a careful check on the further
distribution of information once it has released it. A. NEmxr, DOSSmR 107-108 (1975).
10. The argument against the release of prior conviction records is based on both due
process grounds and considerations of public policy. Testimony of Aryeh Neier, Executive
Director, American Civil Liberties Union; Accompanied by John H. F. Shattuck, Staff
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union, Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963 and S.
2964 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Seass., pt. 1 at 245-46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of
Neier].
11. For discussion of the consequences which flow from the dissemination of arrest
records, see Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, (D.C. Cir. 1970) on remand 328 F. Supp.
718 (D.D.C. 1971), remanded 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. See Comment: Arrest Records - Protecting the Innocent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 629,
630-36 (1974). See also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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determine the ultimate disposition of the case.' 3 Where the arrest
does not result in conviction or where the person arrested is subsequently exonerated, the retention of the arrest record by the
F.B.I. is obviously misleading, and potentially damaging. In one
of many documented cases," a black college student was arrested
and acquitted of robbery charges in Washington, D.C. Since that
time, police have on at least three occasions shown his photograph in neighborhoods where crimes were committed, presumably to have him identified as the criminal. Although there is no
evidence that this man has ever committed a crime, he, his family
and his friends have been subjected on numerous occasions to
interrogation. There are many other instances of people being
denied credit or employment, or losing jobs and respect in the
community as a result of the transmission of information to credit
bureaus, private employers and others. 15 Very often the victim in
such a case is not even aware that the information being used
exists. 6
Even more susceptible to misuse is information maintained
by criminal justice agencies under the heading of "intelligence
data."' 7 There is no indication that such information is treated
with any greater care with respect to accuracy or dissemination
than are conviction and arrest records. It is readily apparent that
a dossier compiled of prior criminal records, incomplete or inaccurate arrest records, and pieces of "intelligence data" will give
13. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
14. Testimony of Neier at 252. See also A. NEIER, DossIE 107 (1975).
15. Although there is no evidence that the F.B.I. directly transmits information to
such private sources, see note 9 supra,distribution is so loosely controlled that information
may eventually find its way into the possession of credit bureaus, private employers, and
the like. See Comment, Arrest Records - Protecting the Innocent, 48 TuL. L. REv. 629,
632-33 (1974). The ramifications of this situation are well documented in A. NEIER,
DOSSIER 133-45 (1975).

16. Attempts by individuals to secure information from federal agencies under statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), have been largely
unsuccessful. See Nader, Freedomfrom Information; The Act and the Agencies, 5 HmV.
Civ. R GHTS-Civ. Lm. L. Rlv. 1, 5-13 (1970). The FOTA specifically excludes from the
obligation to disclose "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes ....
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (1967). The FOTA has been amended by the addition of the Privacy
Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, but this also specifically excludes criminal justice agencies
from its scope. See note 46 infra.
17. "Intelligence data" has been defined as the "raw material" of an investigation.
Testimony of Neier, supra note 10, at 249. It may consist of information relating to
conduct such as religious or political activity or hearsay statements and other "uncorroborated information." Id. at 249-50. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at 11, col. 2.
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rise to a rather distorted and misleading picture and, when released indiscriminately to employers or to credit companies, will
likely result in serious injury.
Even those concerned with the abuses of sophisticated criminal justice information systems concede that these systems do
serve a legitimate purpose in aiding law enforcement.'" In recognition, however, of the serious invasion of privacy resulting from
those abuses, there has been an enormous amount of activity on
both the state and federal levels to investigate and control the
situation through legislation. 9
Attempts have also been made, through the judiciary, to
protect individuals from the indiscriminate and injurious use of
criminal justice information." The courts have generally, however, "[s]crupulously avoid[ed]" 2' the larger constitutional issues presented by the collection and dissemination of information, by basing their decisions on statutory grounds.22
18. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1974); Address by William H. Rehnquist,
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University
of Kansas Law School, at 3, Sept. 26 and 27, 1974, on file in Hofstra Law Library
[hereinafter cited as Address by Rehnquist]; cf. A. NE=, DossiER 119-32 ("Maintenance
and dissemination of records appears to be a larger part of the cause than of the solution
for crime." Id. at 129).
19. The following is a partiallist of bills and resolutions introduced in the first session
of the 94th Congress in January, 1975, to deal with the intelligence operations of government agencies: S.84; H.R. 142, 266, 539 (to prohibit surveillance of civilians by the Armed
Forces); H.R. 1185 (to define military authority to collect, distribute and store information
concerning civilian political activity); H.R. 61, 62 (security of criminal justice information); H.R. 388 (authorize exchange of criminal record information); H.R. 1084 (establish
information - gathering practices of federal agencies); H.R. 1098 (inform individuals of
records held by government agencies); H.R. 550, 1005 (regulate disclosure of information
to government agencies); H.R. 533, 616, 955, 1779 (restrict authority for inspection of
income tax returns); H.R. 662, 721, 869, 1464 (prohibit sale by federal agencies of mailing
lists); H.R. 563 (destroy F.B.I. files on members of Congress).
Between Jan. 8 and Feb. 28, 1975, the following bills were introduced in the 198th
session of the New York State Legislature: A.2994 (to make it unlawful for any public
licensing agency to inquire about or act upon information concerning an arrest of an
applicant which has not been followed by conviction); S.2726; A.3487 (to require that
people have access to confidential information contained in records of public or private
agencies); S.1191-A; A.2175-A (personal records under control of police agencies, state
department or political subdivision shall be confidential and not subject to inspection or
review without police officers' permission); S.729; A.1218 (to prohibit police officer or
agency from releasing information pertaining to criminal record of arrested person or
defendant, other than to law enforcement personnel and agencies).
20. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22. Id.; Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Millstone v.
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In Sims v. Fox, 3 a reserve officer brought suit to enjoin the
Air Force from discharging him without a hearing, after he had
pleaded nolo contendere to charges of indecent exposure. In addition to his claim that this discharge deprived him of property,
Sims argued that he had suffered a loss of liberty. Although Sims'
discharge papers would show that he had been "honorably discharged," an accompanying code would reveal that he had been
discharged for "unfitness, unacceptable conduct, or in the interest of national security." 4 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that "[t]he mere presence of derogatory information
in confidential files is not an infringement of 'liberty' ",25 where
the truthfulness of the information was not denied, despite the
fact that there was evidence that the retention of such information would, under Air Force regulations, have the effect of
"blacklist[ing]" the ex-officer from future service in the Air
26
Force, Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard.
In Menard v. Saxbe,11 appellant Dale Menard brought an
action to have his arrest record expunged from the files of the
F.B.I. Menard, a nineteen year old college student, was arrested
by Los Angeles police who had received reports of a prowler in the
neighborhood. Although no criminal complaint was ever filed
against him and there was no evidence that any crime had ever
been committed, Menard's fingerprints and a report that he had
Court of Appeals
been arrested were forwarded to the F.B.I. The
2
for the District of Columbia recognized that:
Although Menard cannot point with mathematical certainty to
the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it clear that
he has alleged a "cognizable legal injury" . . . . [The] unlawful maintenance of records of arrest results in "injuries and dangers" that are "plain enough" . . . and. . . "this threat is not
dissipated, or rendered insubstantial or illusory, by the fact that
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (defendant credit bureau held
liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970), for damages
resulting from the dissemination of inaccurate and damaging information).
23. 505 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
24. Id. at 862.
25. Id. at 863.
26. Id. at 866 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
27. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For fuller treatment of the facts of this case, see
A. NEIER, DOSSIER 96-97 (1975); Address by Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 10-12.
28. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the arrest was not followed by a prosecution." [citations omitted].
The court went on to explain that arrest records are often
used outside the field of criminal justice, and that they often
prove to be a "substantial barrier" to employment." While maintaining that it was "not now called upon to evaluate these practices of the F.B.I., '3 the court adopted the district court's findings of fact 3' from which it concluded that the F.B.I. system of
collecting and disseminating arrest records was "out of effective
control." 3 The court found that there are "no controls" over the
accuracy of information received from outside agencies and "little
supervision and control" over the uses to which information disseminated by the F.B.I. is put. 3 In Menard's case, however, the
F.B.I. had, shortly after the commencement of the law suit,
changed its records to indicate that Menard had been "de,tained," rather than arrested.3 4 The court ruled, then, that the
F.B.I. had no statutory authority to retain a record of a mere
"encounter with the police" in its criminal files" and ordered
expungement. The F.B.I. could, however, maintain Menard's fingerprints in its "neutral," non-criminal files.3
In Tarlton v. Saxbe,37 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia was again faced with a request for expungement of
information from F.B.I. files. Tarlton, alleging both past and future injuries, sought to have his F.B.I. criminal file expunged
because it contained records of arrests and convictions which
were incomplete and inaccurate. Basing its opinion once again on
the statutory authority of the F.B.I. to maintain criminal files,38
the court concluded that Congress could not have intended to
grant the F.B.I. the authority to collect and disseminate inaccurate information, so as to injure, libel or possibly invade the consti29. Id. at 1024.
30. Id. at 1026.

31. Id. at 1020-22, 1026-27.
32. Id. at 1026, quoting from Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D.D.C.
1971), remanded, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 1026.
34. Id. at 1020.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1030.
Id.
507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970).
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tutional rights of private
citizens.3 9 Ruling that the F.B.I., within
"practical limits,"4 has an affirmative duty to maintain its records accurately, the court remanded the case to the district court
to determine the extent of that duty. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals "suggested" that the lower court inquire into such questions as how the F.B.I. should be required to keep its files accurate and up to date, and whether the F.B.I. should grant individuals the right to discover and rebut information kept about them.4
Judge Wilkey dissented vigorously4 2 from the approach taken
by the court in Tarlton, regarding it as an encroachment of legislative perogative. The court's actions should, however, be lauded
as far-reaching and responsive to an urgent problem. Nevertheless, there remains a pressing need for comprehensive Congressional review and revision of the entire system of data collection
and dissemination throughout the criminal justice network. Indeed, the majority in Tarlton recognized this need when it stated
that it "would welcome legislative action designed to meet the
issues discussed in [its] opinion." 43
There is much merit to the view that the uses and abuses of
criminal justice investigative systems are best dealt with by the
legislature. There has recently been much activity on both the
federal and state levels dealing with the problems caused by the
apparently widespread intrusion by government agencies into the
privacy of American citizens. 4 The result of this activity has been
the proposal and passage of numerous privacy statutes45 which
are designed to protect individuals from invasion of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The privacy legislation which re39. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court concluded

that the grant of such authority would raise "the gravest constitutional issues." Id. at
1123.
40. Id. at 1127.
41. Id. at 1129-30.
42. Id. at 1131-32 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)("The court here is obviously using Tarlton's complaint to undertake a full-scale legislative inquiry of national scope.") See also
A. NEaIR, DossmaR 188 (1975).
43. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
45. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S.729, 198th N.Y. Leg. (1975); S.B. 387, 7th
Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (1972) (vetoed by Gov. Win. A. Egan July 6, 1972). For a survey of
state statutes relating to access to criminal records see Hearings on S.2542, S. 2810, S.
2963 & 2964 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 715 (1974).
In addition, there has been a large amount of legislative activity in the general area
of privacy rights. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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cently died in a Senate subcommittee4 6 was specifically directed
at the operations of agencies within the criminal justice intelligence system. The bill not only provided for the right of individuals to discover and refute information kept about them,4 7 but it
also attempted to place limits on who could receive such information.4" The statute also provided for criminal sanctions against
those within the criminal justice system who provided
information to persons or entities unauthorized to receive it."
Clearly, private members of the public - the press included would not have been considered authorized recipients of such
information.
There is irony in the fact that the press, which has been
instrumental in focusing attention on the possibly unconstitutional activities of agencies such as the C.I.A. and F.B.I.,"I would
object to legislation designed to protect individuals from those
very activities. Some members of the press have expressed the
fear that their constitutionally guaranteed rights are in jeopardy
as a result of what they perceive as years of hostility from the
administration in Washington. 5' They seem, therefore, to view
with distrust anything that hints at government intervention
with the rights of a free press. The major objections posed by the
press to privacy legislation in general, 5 and the defunct Senate
bill in particular, 3 are that (1) such legislation constitutes an
impermissible intrusion into the constitutionally guaranteed
right of free press by hampering the access of the press to informa46. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Congress did, however, pass the Privacy Act
of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, which is designed to protect against the invasion of privacy
resulting from abuses in information processing by federal agencies. The Act is essentially
identical with the now defunct S. 2963, supra, in every respect except that it specifically
excludes criminal justice agencies from its scope.
47. S.2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 207 (1974) ("Access by Individuals for Purposes of
Challenge").
48. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1974) ("Dissemination, Access and UseGenerally"). Section 201(b) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act access
to criminal justice information shall be available only to authorized officers or employees
of the criminal justice agency which maintains such information."
49. S.2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1974) ("Criminal Penalties").
50. Articles concerning the activities of the C.I.A. and F.B.I. have appeared regularly
on the front page of major newspapers. See e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 2;
Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1975, at Al, col. 2; id., Jan. 29, 1975, at Al, col. 1; id., Jan.
26, 1975, at Al, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
51. Address by Homby, supra note 5, at 1-2.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Testimony of Anderson, supra note 5.
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tion; (2) the legislature is impermissibly "balancing' the rights of
free press against the rights of privacy; and (3) this legislation
promotes and fosters government secrecy under the "guise" of
protecting the right to privacy. This paper will analyze each of
these claims made by the press to determine whether privacy
legislation does indeed infringe upon the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
I.

PRIVACY LEGISLATION AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE INVASION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION.

A.

In Search of a First Amendment Guarantee of Access to
Information.
Members of the press have urged for years that the first

amendment, which guarantees them the free and unhampered
right to publish, must necessarily include the right to gain access
to information." Because the proposed Senate legislation had
provided for criminal sanctions against those within the criminal
justice system who gave information to persons unauthorized
to receive it,-" the effect, it was argued, would be to "dry up"
sources of information. This restriction on sources of information
would presumably represent impermissible interference with the
constitutional protection offered the press. 6

It is established that a primary objective of the first amendment is to secure and protect the free flow of information. 57 While

the Supreme Court has ruled that the first amendment does protect the right to disseminate1 and receive information, 9 it has
consistently refused to expand that premise to include an unlim-

ited right of access to information. 0
54. Testimony of Anderson, supra note 5 at 404, 423. See generally, Comment, The
Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
55. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § § 309 (1974).
56. Testimony of Anderson, supra note 5.
57. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
58. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (right to publish free
of prior restraint); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (right to distribute literature).
59. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscenity); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting ringing of doorbells to distribute handbills is
violative under the first amendment freedom of speech and press).
60. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 1617 (1965). See generally Comment, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 9

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 19751

In Zemel v. Rusk, 6' appellant argued that the Secretary of
State's refusal to validate his passport for travel to Cuba was
violative of the first amendment, in that it infringed upon his
right to travel abroad to acquaint himself firsthand with facts
pertaining to United States foreign policy. The Supreme Court,
in upholding the Secretary's constitutional authority to take such
action, stated:62
We must agree that the Secretary's refusal to validate passports
for Cuba renders less than wholly free the flow of information
concerning that country. While we further agree that this is a
factor to be considered in determining whether appellant has
been denied due process of law, we cannot accept the contention
of appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is involved
. . .The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information.
Although the first amendment makes separate mention of
rights of speech and rights of press, 3 courts have consistently
combined both within the concept of "freedom of expression." 4
In regard to the gathering of information the Supreme Court has
again failed to attribute significance to the separate mention of
65
press and speech, when it stated:
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally.
The press' claim to a constitutional right of access to information has been raised in cases where reporters have sought to
establish a constitutional privilege to preserve the confidentiality
61. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).

62. Id. at 16-17.
63. The first amendment reads, in part:
Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.

64. Note, The Right of the Press to GatherInformation, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 84042 (1971).
65. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (dicta). In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court cited United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E. 2d 777, 778 (1954)
which upheld a court order excluding the general public and the press from a courtroom.
Although the press does not have a special right of access to information, it is entitled to
at least the amount of access afforded to the general public. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 541-42 (1965) (access to trials). See also Comment, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to GatherInformation, 87 HARv. L. Rxv. 1505, 1521 n.96 (1974).
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of their sources.66 In Branzburg v. Hayes,6 7 the Supreme Court,

in a 5-4 decision, cited Zemel v. Rusk with approval and refused
to acknowledge any special right of access secured to the press by
the Constitution. The Court distinguished between the infringement on the freedom of the press arising out of the requirement
that reporters divulge their sources of information from that
which arises from an intrusion upon the actual content of expression:"6
[Tihese cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly,
no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish,
and no express or implied command that the press publish what
it prefers to withhold. . . .The use of confidential sources by
the press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to
seek news from any source by means within the law.
The Court in Branzburg noted that the press is often excluded from such events as grand jury proceedings and trials
where "such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair
trial before an impartial tribunal." 9 In so doing, the Court cited
with approval ° a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third
72
Circuit7 which held:
We think that this question of getting at what one wants to
know, either to inform the public or to satisfy one's individual
curiosity is a far cry from the type of freedom of expression,
comment, criticism so fully protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution.
Although the judiciary has deferred to Congress the task of
delineating reporters' rights on the question of withholding
sources of information, 3 the issue of whether the first amendment
guarantees the press a special right of access to information is by
66. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See generally, Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press
Privilege, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 233 (1974); D'Alemberte, JournalistsUnder the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARv. J. LEGIS. 307, 319-20 (1969).
67. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68. Id. at 681-82.
69. Id. at 684-85.

70. Id. at 684.
71. Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
72. Id. at 885.
73. Ervin, In Pursuitof a PressPrivilege, 11 HARV.J. LEGIS. 233, 255 (1974); Address
by Hornby, supra note 5, at 12.
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no means dead.74 It has been argued that the Court's pronouncement in Zemel that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrainedright to gather information" (emphasis added) gives rise to the "necessary implication

. . .

that

some right to gather information does exist."75 It has been observed, moreover, that courts since Branzburg have chosen to
interpret that decision broadly so as not to foreclose the possibility that a constitutional right of access to information does exist."
B. Access to Information and Privacy Legislation
Whether or not a right to gather information does exist, it
appears that the press' claim that proposed privacy legislation
would impermissibly interfere with that right, is not well
founded. One of the defects of the now defunct Senate bill was
that it was written in overly-broad language. For instance, the
section providing for criminal penalties read: 7
Whoever willfully disseminates, maintains, or uses information
knowing such dissemination, maintenance, or use to be in violation of this Act shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
This section, however, when read in the context of the entire bill,
was aimed at government officials who illegally transmit information to unauthorized persons. The drafters could (and should)
have included a provision stating that nothing in the statute
might be construed as authorizing the abridgement of the right
of the press to publish. Such a provision would not have affected
the meaning of the statute,78 and would have made clear that
penalties could not be imposed upon the press. Within the context of privacy legislation, therefore, the press would still be free
to gather information from any willing source, including govern74. Address by Hornby at 12; Comment, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1519-21 (1974); Note, The Right of the Press
to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838 (1971).
75. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 n.4 (Stewart, J. dissenting). See also,
Comment, The Rights of the Publicand the Press to GatherInformation,87 HARv. L. REv.
1505, 1520 (1974).
76. Comment, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARv.L. REv. 1505, 1530-33 (1974). But see Ervin, In Pursuitof a Press Privilege,11 HAv.
J. LEGIS. 233, 255-60 (1974) (concluding that Branzburg turned the issue of testimonial
privilege exclusively over to the legislature).
77. S.2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1974).
78. See Testimony of Anderson, supra note 5, at 422 (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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ment officials not deterred by the threat of criminal sanctions. In
reporters to disclose
Branzburg, the majority justified compelling
79
their sources of information by stating:
The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or
restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source
by means within the law. No attempt is made to require the
press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to
disclose them on request.
The Court's contention that the use of confidential sources
by the press is not restricted by the denial of a testimonial privilege is open to debate. The threat of a civil contempt citation 0 is
likely to discourage a reporter from seeking out access to confidential sources.8' The Court's reasoning can be successfully applied, however, to the position of the press with respect to privacy
legislation. In that context, the press would in no way be
prevented from soliciting information from persons within the
criminal justice system and no adverse consequences would attach to the use of such information by the reporter. The press
would still be free to print and disseminate whatever information
it did receive. In New York Times Co. v. United States,82 Justice
Douglas noted in his concurring opinion that the statute in question in that case- prohibited persons with unauthorized possession of information detrimental to national defense from wilfully
communicating it to persons not entitled to receive it. Justice
Douglas stated that "Congress has been faithful to the command
of the First Amendment in this area," because there was a specific caution within the Act: it was not to be construed as authorizing an infringement upon freedom of press or speech.8 4 Again,
such a provision would be essential to any good privacy legislation.
In addition, the press would still be free within the context
79. 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1974).
80. See, e.g., In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3, cert. denied, 62 N.J. 80,
299 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (reporter held in civil contempt and
confined to county jail for refusal to reveal source of information).
81. In his dissenting opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731-33, Justice
Stewart points out that compelling reporters to testify will have the effect of causing them
to cease investigating and publishing information.
82. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1950).
84. 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971).
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of privacy legislation to go to the primary sources of information
-for example, court records and police blotters. 5 In light of the
inherently suspect and inaccurate records currently being kept by
criminal justice agencies, it would seem to enhance the spirit of
the first amendment to encourage the press to gather its information from more reliable sources."5
If.

DOES PRIVACY LEGISLATION IMPERMISSIBLY BALANCE RIGHTS OF

PRESS AGAINST RIGHTS OF PRIVACY?

A.

Privacy Rights v. Rights of Press: The Balancing Test

Another major objection which had been posed by members
of the press against the Senate bill was that their first amendment rights were being invaded for the sake of, or under the
"guise" of, protecting privacy rights."' The approach used by
courts in cases where the rights of the press are seemingly in
conflict with other fundamental rights has been to weigh and
balance one interest against the other. In NAACP v. Button,"9
the Supreme Court noted that: °
The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting
First Amendment freedoms...
Thus, compelling reporters to disclose their sources of information has been justified by the overriding public interest in
"ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights
of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all
85. Testimony of Anderson, supranote 5, at 422 (exchange between Ervin and Anderson).
86. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 634 (1970). (controls may "introduce honesty, decency and openness" into our system and therefore "expand rather than contract freedom of expression.").
87. Address of Hornby, supra note 5, at 6.
88. Branzburk v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972) (balancing rights of press against

public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grant jury proceedings); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (balancing rights of press against rights of privacy);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (balancing rights of press against legitimate state
interest in the regulation of professional conduct); United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y.
71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954) (balancing rights of press against right to fair trial). Generally,
where the state's action infringes on the first amendment rights of the press, the state is
required to show that its goal cannot be achieved by alternative means, NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
89. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

90. Id. at 438.
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other persons." 9 ' Similarly, the right to exclude the press from
judicial proceedings has been upheld in deference to the need to
maintain absolute fairness in such proceedings.92 Another area in
which the rights of the press have been balanced against other
legitimate state interests is the area involving alleged endangerment to national security.9 3 In New York Times Co. v. United
States,94 for instance, the Supreme Court refused to grant an
injunction against the publication of such information on the
grounds that the government had not met the burden of showing
justification for the imposition of prior restraint.
The "weighing and balancing" approach to restrictions on
constitutional rights has been severely criticized by both members of the press9 5 and members of the judiciary. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 7 the Supreme Court devised the test by
which the press is liable for damages in a libel action brought by
public officials when it publishes with "actual malice or reckless
disregard for the truth." Two concurring Justices were of the
opinion that "an unconditional right to say what one pleases
about public affairs is . . .the minimum guarantee of the First
Amendment."98 And in New York Times Co. v. United States,99
two Justices argued that the first amendment provides the press
absolute protection against prior restraint.
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
has employed the balancing approach to weigh the rights to the
press against the right of individual privacy. ' In Time, Inc. v.
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972).
92. See Comment, The ImpartialJury-Twentieth Century Dilemma: Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Pressand FairTrial, 51 CoRNELL L.Q. 306, 322 (1966).
93. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); See also Comment,
The Rights of the Public and the Press to GatherInformation,87 HAav. L. REv. 1505, 1527
(1974).
94. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
95. Address by Homby at 8-9.
96. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355-57 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[In light of the command of the First Amendment, no 'accommodation' of its freedoms
can be 'proper' except those made by the Framers themselves," id. at 356); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-401 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 401-402 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Note, The Speech and Press Clause
of the FirstAmendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARv. L. REv. 374, 379-80 (1973).
97. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
98. Id. at 297 (Black, J. concurring).
99. 403 U.S. 713,(1971).
100. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., - U.S. _, 95 S.Ct. 463, 465 (1974);
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Hill,'0 ' the Court applied the New York Times test of "actual
1 2 to the pubmalice . . . or. . . reckless disregard for the truth""
lication of "false reports of matters of public interest." ' 3 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Black attacked the weighing and balancing approach as a "Constitution-ignoring-and-destroying
technique."'' He amplified by stating that:'0 5
The prohibitions of the Constitution were written to prohibit
certain specific things, and one of the specific things prohibited
is a law which abridges freedom of the press. . . . The "weighing" doctrine plainly encourages and actually invites judges to
choose for themselves between conflicting values, even where, as
in the First Amendment, the Founders made a choice of values,
one of which is a free press.
If judges have, however, by their own fiat today created a right
of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press that
the Constitution created, then tomorrow and the next day and
the next, judges can create more rights that balance away other
cherished Bill of Rights freedoms.
Justice Black predicted that the balancing approach as employed in Time, Inc. v. Hill was "bound to pass away as its
application to new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom
of the press from destruction in libel cases and other cases like
this one."'0 6 This prediction has not been borne out, however, as
the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,'" reaffirmed
the use of the weighing and balancing approach. The Court ruled,
in Gertz, that the state could, short of imposing strict liability,
apply a less stringent standard than that used in New York Times
in determining the liability of those who publish defamatory
falsehoods about private individuals.'0 In addition, the Supreme
Court recently held a newspaper liable for invasion of privacy on
the ground that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355-57 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
101. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
102. Id. at 387.
103. Id. at 388.
104. Id. at 399.
105. Id. at 399-400.
106. Id. at 398.
107. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
108. Id. at 347.
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newspaper had published with actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth.' 9
B. Balancing of Interests and its Application to Privacy
Legislation
Against this background of the rights of the press being pitted against the right to privacy, members of the press objected
to privacy legislation as one more way in which their first amendment freedoms were being eroded." '° Attention must be given to
two important considerations before this claim can be analyzed.
Although the Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions,
recognized that a "zone of privacy" is protected by the Bill of
Rights,"' the parameters of that "zone" are unclear." 2 It has been
argued, therefore, that:"'
The problem of reconciling First Amendment rights and
privacy rights, where they conflict, is

. .

. one of defining the

constitutional boundaries of the privacy system.
In addition, a distinction must be made between the act of
intruding into the zone of privacy and the publication of information obtained from within that zone of privacy. The Supreme
Court cases involving the press have dealt primarily with the
issue of publication of such information.' 4 While the majority
approach has been to strike a "balance" between free press and
privacy," 5 the argument has been made that the first amendment
guarantees an absolute and unconditional right to publish which
may not be made subject to or diminished by any other right or
interest." 6
Where there is intrusion into the zone of privacy, however,
courts have ruled that such activity is not protected. The distinc109. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., - U.S. _
, 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974).
110. Address by Homby, supra note 5.
111. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483-85 (1965). See also Address by Rehnquist.
112. See Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RuTGERms L. Rxv. 275, 275-76 (1974). See
also A. NEER, Dossa 186-89 (1975).
113. T. E.ERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 549 (1970).
114. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343 (Mar. 3, 1975); Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co.,
U.S. ___ 95 S.Ct. 465 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967).
115. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
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tion between the act of intrusion and publication of information
17
was well articulated in Pearsonv. Dodd:'
[MIn analyzing a claimed breach of privacy, injuries from intrusion and injuries from publication should be kept clearly separate. Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be
liable whatever the content of what he learns. An eavesdropper
to the marital bedroom may hear marital intimacies, or he may
hear statements of fact or opinion of legitimate interest to the
public; for purposes of liability that should make no difference.
On the other hand; where the claim is that privileged information concerning plaintiff has been published, the question of
whether that information is genuinely private or is of public
interest should not turn on the manner in which it has been
obtained ....
The right of the press to publish information it receives was
reiterated in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn."' In that case, the
Supreme. Court ruled that the state cannot impose sanctions
upon one who publishes the names of rape victims obtained from
public records. Once again, the Court distinguished between the
content of publication - which the state may not interfere with
- and conduct involved in acquiring such information. While
asserting that:"'
We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access
by the public and press to various kinds of official records ...
the Court nonetheless suggested that if the publication of matters
arguably within the zone of privacy is to be prevented, the state
should "respond by means which avoid public documentation or
other exposure of private information." 20
Because of the nature of the dossiers prepared and disseminated by criminal justice agencies,' 21 they are, taken as a whole,
within the zone of privacy protected by the Bill of Rights. While
these dossiers include matters of public record such as conviction
117. 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969) (newspaper
columnist who received copies of documents removed by others from plaintiff's office was
not liable for conversion of the physical documents).
118. 43 U.S.L.W. 4343 (Mar. 3, 1975).
119. Id. at 4352, n.26.
120. Id. at 4352.
121. See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
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and arrest records, the information contained therein is marred
by both the inclusion of so called "intelligence" data and the
frequent omission of vital follow-up information. These records,
filed under an individual's name, create a composite view of that
individual which is in no sense "public." In addition, it does not
necessarily follow that because bits and pieces of information
have been collected by a government agency, that those bits and
pieces do not remain very much within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy. To take an extreme example: there have
been reports in the press that the F.B.I. has been collecting information about the sexual habits of some public officials. 2 1 If the
F.B.I. received information concerning the sex life of a private
individual, it can hardly be argued that this information automatically becomes part of the "public record."
Clearly then, the constitutionally protected right of privacy
is essential in ensuring that at least some aspects of an individual's life remain private. It is that privacy right which bills such
as the now defunct Senate bill are designed to protect. Privacy
legislation does not close off matters which have always been on
the public record, as the press maintains,13 since conviction and
arrest records may still be found in court records and on police
blotters. Such legislation does not restrict the press in its attempts to gain access to information; it does, instead, provide for
sanctions against those government officials who intrude upon an
individual's zone of privacy by transmitting "private" information to persons unauthorized to receive it. Carefully drafted legislation would not interfere with the freedom of the press to gather
information from any willing source and, most importantly, the
press would still be free to print and disseminate any information
it did receive.
III.

DOES PRIVACY LEGISLATION PROMOTE AND FOSTER
GOVERNMENT SECRECY?

A free and independent press is inherently repelled by any
evidence of secrecy, especially in government. Some members of

the press have expressed the fear that privacy legislation, while
it purports to protect the individual, is actually intended to promote and foster government secrecy. 2 4 If the privacy legislation
122. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
123. Address by Homby at 12.
124. Id. at 6.
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is well drafted and well executed, however, there appears to be
no danger of this. The Senate bill not only provided for access by
individuals for the purpose of discovering and challenging records
kept about them,' but would also have established an administrative board 2 1 to oversee the operations of criminal justice agen-

cies. Each criminal justice agency would have been required to
make periodic disclosure of its mode of operation and the kinds
of activities which it pursues.'2

1

Clearly, such legislation would

not have entitled an agency to withhold information about its
own operations, but it would have barred that agency from indiscriminately releasing damaging information concerning an
individual. Rather than provide criminal justice agencies with a
cloak behind which to hide, privacy legislation may well afford
us the much-needed opportunity to look within those systems
which for too long have shut the public and press out.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We are still in the process of discovering the facts about the
criminal justice investigative intelligence systems and their operations. Clearly, steps must be taken to remedy what is apparently
a very dangerous situation and to protect against future abuse.
This article has focused upon one proposed Senate bill because
(1) it is quite certain that very similar legislation will be introduced in the near future'1, and (2) it may serve as a useful model
on which to base such future proposals. It seems certain, as well,
that when such legislation is reintroduced, the press will raise
objections similar to the claims examined in this article.
The concerns expressed by the press in reaction to privacy
legislation are real and important. It is certainly in our best interest to ensure that the rights of the press are not infringed upon
so that the press may continue to view with healthy skepticism
and to criticize government agencies and their actions. It is
equally important that individuals be protected from the serious
invasion of privacy resulting from abuses of the criminal justice
investigative intelligence systems. It appears, upon examination,
125. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1974).
126. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a) (1974).
127. S. 2963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(a) (1974).
128. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights, on Feb. 27, 1975, Attorney General Edward H. Levy recommended that such
legislation be enacted. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1975, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 3, col. 1.
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that well drafted privacy legislation would meet both of these
vital objectives.
Faith Wender
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